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Abstract
We develop a dynamic politico-economic theory of welfare state,
featuring three groups of voters: skilled workers, unskilled workers,
and old retirees. The welfare-state is modeled by a proportional tax
on labor income to finance a demogrant in a balanced-budget manner
to capture the essence of inter- and intra-generational redistribution of
a typical welfare system. Migrants arrive when young and their birth
rate exceeds the native-born birth rate. We characterize political-
economic equilibrium policy rules consisting of the tax rate, the skill
composition of migrants, and the total number of migrants, in terms
of demographic and labor productivity characteristics. We find that
political coalitions will form among skilled and unskilled voters or
among unskilled and old voters in order to block the other group from
∗The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
represent those of TMB Bank Plc. Ltd. or its executives.
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coming into power. As a consequence, the ideal polices of the unskilled
voters always feature in any political economy equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Milton Friedman reminded us that, obviously, one cannot have free immigra-
tion and a generous welfare state, at the same time. Indeed, public opinion
in the developed economies, with a fairly generous welfare system, favors
putting in some way or another restrictions on migration (see, for example,
Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007, 2009)). A skilled and young migrant
may help the finances of the welfare state; whereas an unskilled and old mi-
grant may inflict a burden on the welfare state. Of a particular interest is
therefore the skill and age composition of these restrictions. A welfare state
with a heterogeneous (by age, skill, etc.) population does not evidently have
a commonly accepted attitude towards migration. This paper develops a
framework to study how these inter- and intra-generational conflicts, among
different age and income groups, is resolved in a politico-economic setup.
A typical welfare state is characterized by both inter -generational redistri-
bution (such as old-age social security) and intra-generational redistribution
(such as income maintenance programs).1 Accordingly, our overlapping gen-
erations model is based on key demographic characteristics: that migrants
are younger and have higher birth rates than the native born population.
The model also features two income levels, skilled labor and unskilled la-
bor. People live for two periods and votings about the current migration and
the generosity of the welfare state are jointly conducted in each period. We
employ the Markov-perfect equilibrium concept, as in Krusell and Rios-Rull
(1996), and Hassler et al. (2003). The forward-looking equilibrium concept
1Some features of the welfare state, such as national health insurance, involve both
inter- and intra-generational redistribution.
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means that each young voter takes into account the effect of her vote on
the evolution of the economy into the next period; which, in turn, affects
the voting outcome in the next period, particularly with respect to the so-
cial security benefit that she receives in the next period, when she grows
old and retires Next period voting, in turn, is influenced by the outcome of
the voting outcome in the following period, and so on. Since a welfare state
will necessarily affect more than two groups of voters, of particular interest
is the characterization of possible coalitions which emerge as decisive in the
political-economic equilibria, for different demographic and skill-distribution
parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses earlier literature
and some evidence for the existence of the fiscal burden of migration. Section
3 presents the analytical framework. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium
policy rules under sincere voting. Section 5 extends the analysis of policy
rules under sincere voting to the case of endogenous wages. Section 6 char-
acterizes the political-economy equilibrium under strategic voting. Section 7
concludes.
2 Background Literature and Fiscal Burden
Our paper is directly related to two fields of the existing political economy
literature: the political economy of the PAYG social security systems (Coo-
ley and Soares (1999), Bohn (2005), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), Galasso
(1999)) and the political economy of migration (such as Benhabib (1996) and
Ortega (2005)). The view that increased migration may come to the rescue of
PAYG social security systems reflects the fact that the flow of migrants can
alleviate the current demographic imbalance as well, by influencing the age
structure of the host economy. A few empirical studies address this point
by calibrating the equilibrium impact of a less restrictive policy towards
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migration according to U.S. data. Storesletten (2000) found in a general
equilibrium model that selective migration policies, involving increased in-
flow of working-age high and medium-skilled migrants, can remove the need
for a future fiscal reform. Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999) performed the
like excercise using partial equilibrium generational accounting and arrived
at similar conclusion. By emphasizing the demographic side and abstract-
ing from the migrants’ factor prices effects, Lee and Miller (2000) concluded
in a similar analysis that a higher number of migrants admitted into the
economy can ease temporarily the projected fiscal burden of retiring baby-
boomers. There are also a few studies which deal with the effect of migrants
on the PAYG social security system (Razin and Sadka (1999) and Scholten
and Thum (1996)). This paper addresses the joint political economy deci-
sions regarding both migration policy and social security policy, and hence,
the welfare state, in a dynamic setup.
There have been previous works on the political economy of immigration
and redistribution policies, albeit focussed solely on either inter-generational
or intra-generational alone. Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002b), and Casarico
and Devillanova (2003) focussed on the impact of immigration the political
economy of inter-generational redistribution. Sand and Razin (2007) took
an additional step to provide a synthesis on the political economy model
jointly determining the inter-generational redistribution and immigration.
Dolmas and Huffman (2004) analyzed similarly the joint determination of
intra-generational redistribution and immigration policy in a dynamic polit-
ical economy model. This paper amalgamates these two lines of research, as
noted, allowing for a redistribution across both inter- and intra-generations.
The European Union, both ”old” (EU-15) and ”new” (after the enlarge-
ment to EU-27), faces a severe aging problem. For instance the ratio of the
elderly population (aged 60 years and over) to the working age population
(aged 15-59 years) in the EU-15 is projected to at least double from about
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20% in the year 2000 to over 40%, in the year 2050. Official retirement
ages have failed to keep up with life expectancy, making pensions and health
care provisions increasingly unaffordable. ”Many people in the rich-world
OECD countries retire relatively early, which let them enjoy, on average,
some 19 years in retirement before death.” (The Economist, February 2nd,
2010). Years in retirement in Italy, Austria and France are 23, 24 and 25,
respectively. The aging process shakes the financial soundness of the welfare
state, especially its old-age security and medical health components, because
there are fewer workers asked to support increasing numbers of retirees. As
put metaphorically by the Economist (March 15th, 2003, 80):. . . ”the fiscal
burden on the diminishing number of worker-bees will rise as more people
turn into pensioner drones.” The Economist (24th August, 2002) also looks
at some of the dimensions of the financial burden: ”On some estimates, by
2050, government debt could be equivalent to almost 100 percent of national
income in America, 150 percent in the EU as a whole [EU-15] and over
250 percent in Germany and France.” Nevertheless, note that migration of
young workers (as distinct from retirees), even when driven by the generos-
ity of the welfare state, slows down the trend of increasing the dependency
ratio. However, economic intuition suggests that even though unskilled mi-
gration improves the dependency ratio, it nevertheless burdens the welfare
state. This is because low-skill migrants are typically net beneficiaries of the
generosity of the welfare state. Indeed, in 1997 the U.S. National Research
Council sponsored a study on the overall fiscal impact of immigration into
the U.S.; see Edmonston and Smith (1997). The study looks comprehensibly
at all layers of government (federal, state, and local), all programs (benefits),
and all types of taxes. For each cohort, defined by age of arrival to the U.S.,
the benefits (cash or in kind) received by migrants over their own lifetimes
and the lifetimes of their first-generation descendants were projected. These
benefits include Medicare, Medicaid, Supplementary Security Income (SSI),
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Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps, Old Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), etc. Similarly, taxes paid di-
rectly by migrants and the incidence on migrants of other taxes (such as
corporate taxes) were also projected for the lifetimes of the migrants and
their first-generation descendants. Accordingly, the net fiscal burden was
projected and discounted to the present. In this way, the net fiscal burden
for each age cohort of migrants was calculated in present value terms. Within
each age cohort, these calculations were disaggregated according to three ed-
ucational levels: Less than high school education, high school education,
and more than high school education. The findings suggest that migrants
with less than high school education are typically a net fiscal burden that
can reach as high as approximately US-$100,000 in present value, when the
migrants’ age on arrival is between 20–30 years.
Following the recent enlargement of the European Union to 27 countries
there were concerns that the EU-15 was likely to face a rise in welfare migra-
tion. Hans-Werner Sinn (Financial Times, July 12th 2004) made a somewhat
alarming prediction:
”There will be more migration in Europe, but it will be ’bad’ mi-
gration as well as ’good’.’Good’ migration is driven by wage and
productivity difference. ’Bad’ migration is driven by generosity
of the welfare state.”
Nevertheless, only three members of the EU-15 (the UK, Sweden and
Ireland) allowed free access for residents of the accession countries to their
national labor markets, in the year of the first enlargement, 2004. The other
members of the EU-15 took advantage of the clause that allows for restricted
labor markets for a transitional period of up to seven years. Focusing on
the UK and the A8 countries2, Dustmann at al (2009) bring evidence of no
2The A8 countries are the first eight accession countries (Czech Republic, Estonia,
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welfare migration. The average age of the A8 migrants during the period
20043-2008 is 25.8 years, considerably lower than the native U.K. average
age (38.7 years). The A8 migrants are also better educated than the natives.
For instance, the percentage of those that left full-time education at the age
of 21 years or later is 35.5 among the A8 migrants, compared to only 17.1
among the U.K. natives. Another indication that the migration is not pre-
dominantly driven by welfare motives is the higher employment rate of the A8
migrants (83.1%) relative to the U.K. natives (78.9%). Furthermore, for the
same period, the contribution of the A8 migrants to government revenues far
exceeded the government expenditures attributed to them. A recent study
by Barbone et al (2009), based on the 2006 European Union Survey of In-
come and Living conditions, finds that migrants from the accession countries
constitute only 1-2 percent of the total population in the pre-enlargement
EU countries (excluding Germany and Luxemburg); by comparison about 6
percent of the population in the latter EU countries were born outside the
enlarged EU. The small share of migrants from the accession countries is, of
course, not surprising in view of the restrictions imposed on migration from
the accession countries to the EU-15 before the enlargement and during the
transition period after the enlargement. The study shows also that there is,
as expected, a positive correlation between the net current taxes (that is,
taxes paid less benefits received) of migrants from all source countries and
their education level4.
Indeed the general public perceives unskilled migrants as a drain on the
public finance. In the U.K., the Daily Mirror (24 July, 2006) puts it bread
and butter terms: ”Economic migrants need schools for their children. They
need housing .They need medical care. They can even lose their jobs.”
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Poland.)
3More accurately, the said period extends from the second quarter of 2004 through the
first quarter of 2009.
4See also Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002)
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Not unexpectedly, employing opinion surveys, Hanson et al (2007) bring
evidence that in the United States native residents of states which provide
generous benefits to migrants also prefer to reduce the number of migrants.
Furthermore, the opposition is stronger among higher income groups. Sim-
ilarly, Hanson et al (2009), again employing opinion surveys, find for the
United States that native-born residents of states with a high share of un-
skilled migrants, among the migrants population, prefer to restrict in mi-
gration; whereas native-born residents of states with a high share of skilled
migrants among the migrant population are less likely to favor restricting
migration (see also Mayda (2006) for work along the same line). Indeed,
developed economies do attempt to sort out immigrants by skills (see, for
instance, Bhagwati and Gordon (2009)). Australia and Canada employ a
point system based on selected immigrants’ characteristics. The U.S. em-
ploys explicit preference for professional, technical and kindred immigrants
under the so-called third-preference quota. Jasso and Rosenzweig (2009) find
that both the Australian and American selection mechanisms are effective in
sorting out the skilled migrants, and produce essentially similar outcomes
despite of their different legal characteristics.
3 Analytical Framework
Consider a standard two-period, overlapping-generations model. The old
cohort retires, while the young cohort works. There are two skill levels:
skilled and unskilled. The welfare-state is modeled simply by a proportional
tax on labor income to finance a demogrant or public services in a balanced-
budget manner5. Therefore, some (the unskilled workers and old retirees)
are net beneficiaries from the welfare state and others (the skilled workers)
are net contributors to it. Migration policies are set to determine the total
5We draw on Sand and Razin (2007) and Suwankiri (2009).
8
migration volume and its skill composition. We characterize Markov-perfect
politico-economic equilibria consisting of the tax rate (which determines the
demogrant), skill composition and the the total number of migrants. We
distinguish between two voting behaviors: sincere and strategic voting.
3.1 Preferences and Technology
The utility of each individual in period t, for young and old, is given, respec-
tively, by
Uy(cyt , l
i
t, c
o
t+1) = c
y
t −
ε(lit)
1+ε
ε
1 + ε
+ βcot+1, i = s, u (1)
U o(cot ) = c
o
t . (2)
where, s and u denote skilled and unskilled labor. Here, y and o denote to
young and old, li is labor, ε is the elasticity of the labor supply, and β ∈ (0, 1)
is the discount factor. Note that cot is the consumption of an old individual
at period t (who was born in period t− 1). Agents in the economy maximize
the above utility functions subject to their respective budget constraints.
Given the linearity of U in ct and ct+1, the only equilibrium interest rate r
equals 1
β
− 1 and individuals have no incentive to either save or dissave. For
convenience, we set saving at zero.6 This essentially reduces the two groups
of old retirees (skilled and unskilled) to just one because they have identical
preference irrespective of their skill level. Therefore, the budget constraints
for the young and old in period t, respectively, are cy,it ≤ wilit+bt and cot ≤ bt.
In addition to decision on consumption, the young also decide on how much
6In fact, any saving level is an optimal choice. Assuming no saving is for pure conve-
nience. With saving, since old individuals do not work the last period of their life, they
will consume savings plus any transfer. Through both these channels, the old individuals
benefit from migration. See Forni (2005), and Sand and Razin (2007).
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labor to supply. Individual’s labor supply is given by
lit =
(
wi(1− τ))ε , i = s, u (3)
where wi is the wage rate of a worker of skill level i = s, u.
There is just one good, which is produced by using the two types of
labor as perfect substitute with constant marginal products.7 The production
function is given by
Yt = w
sLst + w
uLut (4)
where Lit is the aggregate labor supply of skill i = s, u. Labor markets are
competitive, ensuring the wages going to the skilled and unskilled workers
are indeed equal to their marginal products, ws and wu, respectively. We
naturally assume that ws > wu.
We denote the demogrant by bt and the tax rate by τt. The agents in the
economy take these policy variables as given when maximizing their utilities.
Because the old generation has no income, its only source of income comes
from the demogrant. The model yields the following indirect utility function
(recall that saving is zero):
V y,i =
((1− τt)wi)1+ε
1 + ε
+ bt + βbt+1
V o = bt,
for i ∈ {s, u}. For brevity, we will use V i to denote V y,i because only the
young workers need to be distinguished by their skill level.
In addition to the parameters of the welfare state (τt and, consequently,
bt), the political process also determines migration policy. This policy con-
sists of two parts: one determining the volume of migration, and the other
7This simplification, nonetheless, allows us to focus solely on the linkages between the
welfare state and migration, leaving aside any labor market consideration. For an analysis
to the other extreme, in which there are only labor market considerations, see Ortega
(2005). In the appendix, we lay out a framework where the two inputs are imperfect
substitutes with diminishing marginal products.
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its skill composition. We denote by µt the ratio of allowed migrants to the
native-born young population and denote by σt the fraction of skilled mi-
grants in the the total number of migrant entering the country in period t.
Migrants are assumed to have identical preference to the native-born. We
assume all migrants come young and they are naturalized one period after
their entrance. Hence, they gain voting rights when they are old.
Let st denote the fraction of native-born skilled workers in the labor force
in period t (where s0 > 0). The aggregate labor supply in the economy of
each type of labor is given by
Lst = [st + σtµt]Ntl
s
t (5)
and
Lut = [1− st + (1− σt)µt]Ntlut , (6)
where Nt is the number of native-born young individuals in period t.
3.2 Dynamics
The dynamics of the economy are given by two dynamic equations: one gov-
erns the aggregate population, while the other governs the skill composition
dynamics. Because skills are not endogenous within the model, we assume for
simplicity that the offspring replicate exactly the skill level of their parents.8
That is,
Nt+1 = [1 + n+ (1 +m)µt]Nt (7)
st+1Nt+1 = [(1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt]Nt,
8Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002b), and Casarico and Devillanova (2003) provide a
synthesis with endogeneous skill analysis. The first work focussed on the shift in skill
distribution of current population, while the latter studied skill-upgrading of future pop-
ulation.
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where n and m are the population growth rates of the native-born population
and the migrants, respectively. We plausibly assume that n < m ≤ 1, and
we allow the population growth rates to be negative. Combining the two
equations above together, we get the dynamics of the labor supply of skilled
native-born as follows:
st+1 =
(1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt
1 + n+ (1 +m)µt
. (8)
Equation (8) implies that the fraction of the native-born skilled in the native-
born labor force will be higher in period t+1 than in period t if the proportion
of skilled migrants in period t is higher than that of the native-born, that
is, if σt > st. Naturally, when there is no migration the share of skilled
workers out of (native-born) young population does not change over time, by
assumption. When migration is allowed and its share of skilled labor is larger
than that of the native-born, the share of skilled labor in the population will
grow over time.
3.3 The Welfare-State System
We model the welfare-state system as balanced period-by-period. In essence,
it operates like a pay-as-you-go system. The proceeds from the labor tax
of rate τt in period t serve entirely to finance the demogrant bt in the same
period. Therefore, the equation for the demogrant, bt, is given by
bt =
τt ((st + σtµt)w
sNtl
s
t + (1− st + (1− σt)µt)wuNtlut )
(1 + µt)Nt + (1 + µt−1)Nt−1
, (9)
which upon some manipulation reduces to
bt =
τt ((st + σtµt)w
slst + (1− st + (1− σt)µt)wulut )
1 + µt +
1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
, (10)
where the individual’s labor supplies are given above in equation (3). It
is straightforward to see that a larger σt increases the demogrant (recall
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that wslst > w
ulut ). That is, a higher skill composition of migrants brings
about higher tax revenues, and, consequently, enables more generous welfare
state, other things being equal. Similarly, upon differentiation of bt with
respect to µt, we can conclude that a higher volume of migration enables a
more generous welfare system if the share of the skilled among the migrants
exceeds the share of the skilled among the native-born workers (σt > st).
4 Political Economy Equilibrium: Sincere Vot-
ing
In this section, we study the politico-economic equilibrium in the model.
First, we begin our analysis with ”sincere voting”, where individuals vote
according to their sincere preference irrespective of what the final outcome
of the political process will be. In this case, the outcome of the voting
is determined by the largest voting group.9 Therefore, it is important to
see who forms the largest voting group in the economy and under what
conditions. Note that there are only three voting groups: the skilled native-
born young, the unskilled native-born young, and the old (recall that there
is no saving, so that all the old care only about the size of the demogrant
and thus have identical interest.
1. The group of skilled native-born workers is the largest group (”the
skilled group”) under two conditions. First, its size must dominates
the unskilled young, and, second, it must also dominate the old cohort.
Algebraically, these are
st >
1
2
(11)
9Evidently, this assumption amounts to majority voting when there are only two voting
groups.
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and
st >
1 + µt−1
1 + n+ µt−1(1 +m)
, (12)
respectively. It can be shown that, because n < m ≤ 1, only the second
of the two conditions is sufficient.
2. The group of unskilled native-born workers is the largest group (”the
unskilled group”) under two similar conditions; that are reduced to just
one:
1− st > 1 + µt−1
1 + n+ µt−1(1 +m)
. (13)
3. The group of old retirees is the largest group (”the old group”), when
its size is larger than each one of the former groups, that is,
1 + µt−1
1 + n+ µt−1(1 +m)
≥ max{st, 1− st}. (14)
With some algebra, one can straightforward demonstrate that this parti-
tions the state space (0, 1) into three parts: when st <
n+µt−1m
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
(the un-
skilled workers are the largest group), when st ∈
[
n+µt−1m
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
, 1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
]
(the old retirees are the largest group, and when st >
1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
(the
skilled workers are the largest group).
4.1 Equilibrium
We first describe what are the variables relevant for each of the three types
of voters when casting the vote in period t. First, st is the variable which
describes the state of the economy. Also, each voter takes into account how
her choice of the policy variables in period t will affect the chosen policy
variables in period t + 1 which depends on st+1 (recall that the benefit she
will get in period t + 1, bt+1, depends on τt+1, σt+1, and µt+1). Therefore
each voter will cast her vote on the set of policy variables τt, σt, and µt which
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maximizes her utility given the values of st, taking also into account how
this will affect st+1. Thus, there is a link between the policy chosen in period
t to the one chosen in period t+ 1. The outcome of the voting is the triplet
of the policy variables most preferred by the largest voting group.
The mechanism (policy rule or function) that characterizes the choice
of the policy variables (τt, σt, and µt) is invariant over time. This mecha-
nism relates the choice in any period to the choice of the preceding period
(τt−1, σt−1, and µt−1). This choice depend also on the current state of the
economy, st. Thus, we are looking for a triplet policy function (τt, σt, µt) =
Φ(st, τt−1, σt−1, µt−1), which is a solution to the following functional equation
Φ(st, τt−1, σt−1, µt−1) = arg max
τt,σt,µt
V d {st, τt, σt, µt,Φ(st+1, τt, σt, µt)} (15)
s.t. st+1 =
(1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt
1 + n+ (1 +m)µt
,
where V d is the indirect utility function of the decisive voter d, and d ∈
{s, u, o} is the identity of the largest voting group in the economy.
This equation states that the decisive (largest) group in period t chooses,
given the state of the economy st, the most preferred policy variables τt, σt,
and µt. In doing so, this group realizes that her utility is affected not only
by these (current) variables, but also the policy variables of the next period
(τt+1, σt+1, µt+1). This group further realizes that the future policy vari-
ables are affected by the current variables according to the policy function
Φ(st+1, τt, σt, µt). Furthermore, this inter-temporal functional relationship
between the policy variables in periods t + 1 and t is the same as the one
existed between period t and t− 1. Put differently, what the decisive group
in period t chooses is related to st, τt−1, σt−1, and µt−1 in exactly the same
way (through Φ(·)) as what the decisive group in period t+ 1 is expected to
be related to st+1, τt, σt, and µt.
Denoting the policy function, Φ(st, τt−1, σt−1, µt−1), by (τt, σt, µt), we can
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show that the outcomes of the policy rule are:
τt =

0 , if the skilled group is the largest
1− 1
J
1+ε− 1
J
, if the unskilled group is the largest
1
1+ε
, if the old group is the largest
σt =

1
, if either the skilled or unskilled group
is the largest and st <
1
1+n
σ̂ < 1
2
, if the skilled group is the largest and st ≥ 11+n
1 , if the old group is the largest.
(16)
µt =

1−(1+n)st
m
, if the unskilled group is the largest and Ψ > 0 or
if the skilled group is the largest and st <
1
1+n
µ̂ < 1 , if the skilled group is the largest and st ≥ 11+n
1
, if the unskilled group is the largest and Ψ ≤ 0
or if the old group is the largest.
where
J =
(st + σtµt)
(
wst
wut
)1+ε
+ 1− st + (1− σt)µt
1 + µt +
1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
(17)
Ψ = but + βb
o
t+1 − b̂t, (18)
where we denote by b̂t the demogrant period t with µt = 1 = σt, and b
u
t the
demogrant in period t with σt = 1 and µt =
1−(1+n)st
m
(both demogrants are
associated with the tax rate preferred by the unskilled group). Similarly, bot+1
is the demogrant in period t + 1 associated with the set of policy variables
preferred by the old group.
Notice that the case st >
1
1+n
cannot happen if the unskilled group is
the largest (because n < 1). In this case, the special migration policy vari-
ables preferred by the skilled group, σ̂, and µ̂, are given implicitly from the
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maximization exercise
〈σ̂, µ̂〉 = arg max
σt,µt
V st =
(Atw
s
t )
1+ε
1 + ε
+ βbot+1 (19)
s. t. (1 + n)st − 1 ≤ µt(1− (1 +m)σt).
When the solution to the problem in (19) is interior, we can describe it by
∂V s
∂σt
∂V s
∂µt
=
µ̂(1 +m)
(1 +m)σ̂ − 1 . (20)
There are also two possible corner solutions: 〈σ̂, µ̂〉 = 〈0, (1 + n)st − 1〉 and
〈σ̂, µ̂〉 =
〈
2−(1+n)st
1+m
, 1
〉
. We explain in details these results below.
4.2 Interpretation: Migration and Tax Policies
The intuition for the aforementioned results is as follows. The skilled is
the net contributor to the welfare state, while the other two groups are net
beneficiaries. We refer to Figure 1 for illustration. Preferences of the old
retirees are simple. If the old cohort is the largest, it wants maximal welfare
state benefits, which means taxing to the Laffer point ( 1
1+ε
). They also allow
the maximal number of skilled migrants in to the economy because of the
tax contribution this generates to the welfare system.
It is interesting to note that, although the unskilled young are net benefi-
ciaries in this welfare state, they are, nevertheless, still paying taxes. Hence
the preferred tax policy of the unskilled voters is smaller than the Laffer point
with a wedge 1
J
, which we will provide further discussions on below. Clearly,
the unskilled workers also prefer to let in more skilled immigrants due to their
contribution to the welfare state. How many will they let in depends on the
function Ψ, which weighs the future benefits against the cost at the present.
Basically, if the unskilled workers are not forward-looking, it is in their best
interest to let in as many skilled migrants as possible. However, this will
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lead to no redistribution in the next period because the skilled workers will
be the largest. Hence, the function Ψ is the difference between the benefits
they get by being, as they are, forward-looking and being myopic.
The skilled native-born young prefer more skilled migrants for a different
reason than the earlier two groups. They prefer to let in skilled migrants in
this case because this will provide a higher number of skilled native workers
in the next period. Thus, because the skilled are forward-looking, they too
will prefer to have more skilled workers in their retirement period. However,
they cannot let in too many of them because their high birth rate may render
the skilled young in the next period as the largest group who will vote to
abolish the welfare state altogether.
A common feature among models with Markov-perfect equilibrium is the
idea that today’s voters have the power to influence the identity of future
policy makers. Such feature is also prominent in our analysis here. As previ-
ously pointed out in Dolmas and Huffman (2004), Ortega (2005), and Sand
and Razin (2007), future political influence of migrants will matter for the
decision on immigration policy today. The migration policy of either young
group reflects this fact that they may want to put themselves as the largest
group in the next period. Thus, instead of letting in too many migrants, who
will give birth to a large new skilled generation, they will want to let in as
much as possible before the threshold is crossed. This threshold is 1−(1+n)st
m
.
Letting st = 1 gets the same result as Sand and Razin (2007). There are
two differences nonetheless. First, the equilibrium here has a bite even if the
population growth rate is positive, which cannot be done when there are only
young and old cohort, unless there is a negative population growth rate as
in their work. Another fundamental difference is that, in order to have some
transfer in the economy, the young decisive largest group has a choice of
placing the next period’s decisive power either in the hand of next period’s
unskilled or the old. So we need to verify an additional condition that it
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is better for this period’s decisive young to choose the old generation next
period, which is the case.
When st ≥ 11+n , we have a unique situation (which is only possible when
n > 0). In this range of values, the number of skilled is growing too fast to
be curbed by reducing migration volume alone. To ensure that the decisive
power of the next period lands in the right hand, that is, the old, the skilled
voters (who are the largest in this period) must make the unskilled cohort
grow to weigh down the growth rate of the skilled workers. This is done by
restricting both the skill composition as well as the size of total migration.10
The tax choice of the unskilled young deserves an independent discussion.
In Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002a, 2002b), it is maintained that the ”fiscal
leakage” to the native-born and to the migrants who are net beneficiaries may
result in a lower tax rate chosen by the median voter. They assume that all
migrants possess lower skill than the native-born. Because this increases the
burden on the fiscal system, the median voter votes to reduce the size of
the welfare state, instead of increasing it. To see such a resemblance the our
result, we must first take the migration volume, µt, and the skill composition,
σt, as given. Letting τ
u
t denote the tax rate preferred by the unskilled group,
one can verify from equation (17) that
∂τut
∂σt
> 0, and there exists σ such that,
for any σt < σ, we have
∂τut
∂µt
< 0. Conversely, for any σt > σ, we would
get an expansion of the welfare state, because
∂τut
∂µt
> 0.11 Therefore, the
10Empirically, with the population growth rate of the major host countries for migration
like the U.S. and Europe going below 1%, it is unlikely that this case should ever be of
much concern. Barro and Lee (2000) provides an approximation of the size of the skilled.
While Barro and Lee statistics capture those 25 years and above, they also cite OECD
statistics which capture age group between 25 and 64. The percentage of this group who
received tertiary education or higher in developed countries falls in the range of 15% to
47%.
11Recall that the tax rate preferred by the unskilled young workers is less than the level
that is preferred by the old retirees. The tax rate preferred by the old retirees, τot =
1
1+ε
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higher number of skilled migrants will prompt a higher demand for intra-
generational redistribution. The fiscal leakage channel shows that unskilled
migration creates more fiscal burden, such that the decisive ”unskilled” voters
would rather have the welfare state shrunken. In addition, an increase in
inequality in the economy, reflected in the skill premium
(
wst
wut
)
, leads to a
larger welfare state demanded by the unskilled.
4.3 Policy Rules: Endogenous Wages
In the appendix, we extend the model to incorporate endogenous wages.
The following policy profile forms a Markov-perfect equilibrium with sincere
voting:
τt =

0 , if the skilled is the largest
1− 1
K
1+ε− 1
K
, if the unskilled is the largest
1
1+ε
, if the old is the largest
σt =

σst , if the skilled is the largest
1 , if the unskilled is the largest
1 , if the old is the largest.
µt =

µst , if the skilled is the largest
1−(1+n)st
m
, if the unskilled is the largest and Ψ̂ > 0
1
, if the unskilled is the largest and Ψ̂ ≤ 0
or if the old is the largest.
where, σs and µs are given below, and K and Ψ̂ are
is the Laffer point that attains the maximum welfare size, given immigration policies.
Therefore the size of the welfare state is monotonic in the tax rate when τ ∈ [0, 11+ε ].
Thus, our use of ”shrink” and ”expand” is justified.
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K =
1− st + (1− σt)µt
(1− α)
(
1 + µt +
1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
)
Ψ̂ = V ut (σt = 1, µt =
1− (1 + n)st
m
, τut )− V ut (σt = 1, µt = 1, τut ),
with τ dt is the tax rate preferred by d ∈ {s, u, o}. For period t, the unskilled
voters seem to prefer σut = 1. However, before drawing a definite conclusion,
we must compare the two levels of utility generated by completely allowing
for maximum possible skilled immigrants and restricting them in order to
be the decisive voter in the next period. The unskilled young would try to
influence next period’s identity of the decisive voter if and only if
V ut (σt = 1, µt =
1− (1 + n)st
m
, τut ) > V
u
t (σt = 1, µt = 1, τ
u
t ),
which compares the forward looking payoff with the myopic payoff as in the
fixed-wage setting.
As for the native-born skilled workers, the situation becomes increasingly
more complex with endogeneous wages. Their preferred tax rate for this pe-
riod is still zero, τ st = 0. However, skilled immigrants generate both cost and
benefit to the native-born skilled workers. They provide a direct labor market
competition, forcing the current skilled wage down. Ideally, the skilled na-
tives would have preferred all unskilled immigrants for this reason. However,
skilled immigrants also provide future benefits through higher transfer in the
next period. This conflict makes their policy choices unclear. One thing is
clear, nevertheless, the skilled voters will always believe that there is positive
future benefit once they retired. To see this, consider if they think the skilled
will for the majority next period, hence T st+1 = 0. Then the only gain from
immigrants would come from bringing as many unskilled in as possible to lift
up the wage. That leads to σt = 0, and µt = 1, which in turn will make the
unskilled voters the largest in the next period. But this produces a contra-
diction to the initial belief of the skilled. Hence we know that, if the skilled
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voters form the largest group in this period, next period’s decisive voter will
either be the unskilled workers or the old. With this information, there are
two problems to solve. First, if next period’s decisive voter is unskilled, then
the utility accrued to the skilled is
V
s|u
t = max
σt,µt∈[0,1]×[0,1]
V st = α
1+εα(1− α)ε(1−α)A1+εt
(
1− st + µt(1− σt)
st + µtσt
)1−α
+ βbut+1
s.t. n+ µtm ≥ (1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt.
If the decisive voter in the next period is controlled by the old, the utility to
this period’s skilled young is
V
s|o
t = max
σt,µt∈[0,1]×[0,1]
V st = α
1+εα(1− α)ε(1−α)A1+εt
(
1− st + µt(1− σt)
st + µtσt
)1−α
+ βbot+1
s.t. 1 + µt ≥ (1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt
and (1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt ≥ n+ µtm.
We denote with V
s|u
t and V
s|o
t the utility received by the skilled workers given
that, respectively, the unskilled young and the old form the largest group in
the next period. Note that the constraints need not be binding. The solution
to each problem could lie entirely in the interior of the constraint set. To
conclude on the policy choices of the skilled young, they must be such that
〈σst , µst〉 = arg max
{
V
s|u
t , V
s|o
t
}
.
4.4 Interpretation
Notice that the proposition looks very similar to the scenario with fixed wages
(see Figure 2). Nonetheless, all incentives that drive the preference of agents
in the economy come through two channels: wage and demogrant. The
demogrant channel is similar to what we previously discussed under fixed
wages. In addition now, through the wage channel, the unskilled workers
benefit from complementarity with the skilled workers, lifting up their wage.
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Hence the unskilled young prefers even more skilled immigration. The func-
tion Ψ̂ is the difference between the utility they get by being forward-looking
and myopic, similar to the fixed wage setup. The labor market channel is
reversed for the skilled workers, who now prefer unskilled immigrants due
to their wage complementarity and shun skilled migrants due to their com-
petitive substitution. Nonetheless, the preference of the skilled workers is
no longer as simple. On the one hand, they prefer unskilled over the skilled
immigrant because of the labor market interaction. On the other hand, they
want to bring more skilled immigrants whose skilled children would help
support the welfare state in the next period. (Recall that the tax rate, and
consequently the demogrant, for this period is zero when the largest group is
skilled. As before, the immigration choices reflect the strategy of the younger
cohort trying to place its older self as the largest group of voters in the next
period.
It is worthwhile to consider the tax preference of the unskilled young in
details. We first take immigration volume, µt, and immigration composition,
σt, as exogeneous. Inequality plays an even more important role in the tax
preference of the unskilled under flexible wages. When, 1 − α, the share of
income going to the unskilled workers falls, tax rate rises to redistribute more
heavily. This can be thought along the line of higher inequality leads to more
redistribution. In fact, more accurately, the relevant measure of inequality
for this expression is share of the income over the share of population, (1−
α)
/
1− st + (1− σt)µt
(
1 + µt +
1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
)
. As this rises, the demand
for redistribution falls. This makes it clear that the bottom line for the size
of the welfare state is inequality as perceived by the unskilled voters.
A quick observation reveals that
∂τut
∂σt
< 0 for µt > 0 and
∂τut
∂st
< 0. That
is, more skilled population in the economy leads to lowering the tax burden.
This is completely opposite to the case under fixed wages. Under fixed wages,
more number of skilled population implies more intra-generational redistri-
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bution. With flexible wages, any increase in the skilled composition increases
both the unskilled wage and demogrant, while lowering the skilled wage. By
lowering tax rate, the unskilled workers get to enjoy higher benefits from
wage complementarity with skilled workers and from lower tax on the fruit
of their labor, albeit lower demogrant. In sum, the larger skill composition
in the economy (both of the native-born and the immigrants) automatically
lowers inequality in the economy, hence the need for intra-generational re-
distribution.
The fiscal leakage channel also reflects these automatic correction in wage
differential across the two working groups. It can be shown that there exists
a cut-off immigrant skill composition, σ˜, such that, for σt < σ˜, we get an
expansion of the welfare state, (
∂τut
∂µt
> 0), and for σt > σ˜, we would get the
opposite effect (
∂τut
∂µt
< 0). These inequalities are opposite to the case of fixed
wages because inequality gets corrected by bringing in more skilled labor.
5 Political Economy Equilibrium: Strategic
Voting
We now return to the model with exogenous wages and turn to strategic
voting. Recall that we have only three groups: the skilled native-born, the
unskilled native-born, and the old. Let the set of three candidates be {s, u, o},
denoting their identity. Then, the decision to vote of any individual must
be optimal under the correctly anticipated probability of winning and policy
stance of each candidate. Because identical voters vote identically, we can
focus on the decision of a representative voter from each group. Let eit ∈
{s, u, o} be the vote of individual of type i ∈ {s, u, o} cast for a candidate.
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The voting decisions e∗t = (e
s∗
t , e
u∗
t , e
o∗
t ) form a voting equilibrium at time t if
ei∗t = arg max
 ∑
j∈{s,u,o}
Pj(eit, e∗−it)V i
(
Φjt ,Φt+1, et+1
) | eit ∈ {s, u, o}
 (21)
for i ∈ {s, u, o}, where Pj(eit, e∗−it) denotes the probability that candidate
j ∈ {s, u, o} will win given the voting decisions, and e∗−it is the optimal
voting decision of other groups that is not i, and Φjt =
(
τ jt , σ
j
t , µ
j
t
)
is the
policy vector if candidate j wins.12 Thus we require that each vote cast by
each group is a best-response to the votes by the other groups. In addition,
the representative voter of each group must take into the account the pivotal
power of their vote, because the entire group will also vote identically. The
voting decision of the old voters is simple, because they have no concern for
the future,
eo∗t = arg max
 ∑
j∈{s,u,o}
Pj(eot , e∗−ot)V i
(
τ jt , σ
j
t , µ
j
t
) | eot ∈ {s, u, o}
 .
After the election, the votes for each candidate are tallied by adding up the
size of each group that have chosen to vote for the candidate. We further
assume no commitment mechanism at the date of policy implementation.
The candidate with the most votes wins the election and gets to implement
his ideal set of policies.
Clearly, each individual prefers the ideal policies of their representative
candidate. Strategic voting opens up the possibility of voting for someone else
that is not the most preferred candidate in order to avoid the least favorable
candidate. For the skilled workers, they prefer the least amount of taxes
and some migration for the future. Thus, they will prefer the policy choice
of the unskilled over the old candidate because the tax rate will be lower.
12The modeling of the voting equilibrium with strategic voting follows Besley and Coate
(1997, 1998).
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As for the old retirees, the higher the transfer benefits, the better. Clearly,
the unskilled candidate promises some benefits whereas the skilled promises
none, so they would prefer the policies of the unskilled over the skilled.
As for the unskilled workers, both rankings are possible: they could either
prefer the policy choice of the skilled over the old, or vice versa. The param-
eters of the model will dictate the direction of their votes. The cut-off tax
policy, τ˜ , is the break-even point for the unskilled between getting taxed but
receiving transfer (policies of the old candidate) or pay no tax at all (policies
of the skilled candidate).Formally, this tax level, τ˜ , is defined implicitly by
the equation
(wu)1+ε
1 + ε
=
((1− τ˜)wu)1+ε
1 + ε
+
τ˜(1− τ˜)ε ((st + σtµt) (ws)1+ε + (1− st + (1− σt)µt) (wu)1+ε)
1 + µt +
1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
.
(22)
We know that such a tax policy exists, because, taking next period’s policies
as given, the payoff in this period to the unskilled is maximized at its preferred
policy and zero at τ = 1. Therefore, at some τ˜ , the equality will hold. This
cut-off tax rate will play an important role for the unskilled young’ voting
decision.
The main problem with ranking the utility streams of the voters is due
to the multiplicity of future equilibria once we extend our work to strategic
voting. This makes it impossible for the voters to get a precise prediction of
what will happen as a result of their action today. Even if we could pin down
all the relative sizes of all possible payoffs in the next period, multiple voting
equilibria do not allow a prediction of which equilibrium will be selected in
the future. To deal with the problem, we restrict the voting equilibrium to
satisfy the stationary Markov-perfect property, similarly to the policy choices
in previous section. Therefore, we are looking for the a triplet policy function
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(τt, σt, µt) = Φ(st, τt−1, σt−1, µt−1, e∗t ) with the voting decisions e
∗
t that solve
the following two problems:
Φ(st, τt−1, σt−1, µt−1, e∗t ) = arg max
τt,σt,µt
V d (st, , τt, σt, µt,Φ(st+1, τt, σt, µt, e
∗
t ))
(23)
s.t. st+1 =
(1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt
1 + n+ µt(1 +m)
,
where d ∈ {s, u, o} is the identity of the the winning candidate, decided
by the voting equilibrium e∗t that satisfies the Markov perfect property and
solves
ei∗t = e
∗ (st, τt−1, σt−1, µt−1, e∗t−1) (24)
= arg max
eit∈{s,u,o}
∑
j∈{s,u,o}
Pj(eit, e∗−it)V i
(
Φjt ,Φ(st+1, τt, σt, µt, e
∗
t ), e
∗ (st+1, τt, σt, µt, e∗t )
)
where Pj(eit, e∗−it) denotes the winning probability of the representative can-
didate j ∈ {s, u, o} given the voting decisions, and e∗−it is the optimal voting
decision of other groups that is not i, and Φjt =
〈
τ jt , σ
j
t , µ
j
t
〉
is the vector of
preferred policy of candidate from group j.
The stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium defined above introduces an-
other functional equation exercise. The first exercise is to find a policy profile
that satisfies the usual Markov-perfect definition, as discussed in the case of
sincere voting in previous section. The second exercise restricts the voting
decision to be cast on the belief that individuals in the same situation next
period will vote in exactly the same way. With this property, the voters in
this period know exactly how future generations will vote and can evaluate
the stream of payoffs accordingly.
Lastly, the policies in voting equilibria are similar to those policies derived
in the case of sincerely voting. This is consistent with the assumption that,
after election, the winning candidate will implement his most ideal policies
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without any reelection motive. Hence any promise to deviate from this ideal
point will be viewed as cheap talk in equilibrium. The policies are always
coupled with a voting decision featuring the largest group always voting for
its representative candidate. In particular, if the group forms the majority
by representing 50% or more of all voting population, all votes cast from this
group will go to its representative candidate. The economy can go through
different equilibrium paths depending on n, m, and s0, as follows:
1. If n+m ≤ 0, the old group is always the absolute majority. Tax rate is
at the Laffer point and the economy is fully open to skilled migration.
2. If n + m > 0, then the dynamics depend on the initial state of the
economy, s0. If s0 ≥ 1+
n
2
1+n
, then the skilled workers are the majority
(controlling 50% of the population), and zero tax rate with limited
skilled migration will be observed. If n
2(1+n)
≥ s0, the unskilled workers
are the majority, then there will be a positive tax rate (less than at the
Laffer point) and some skilled migration. If n < 0, then initially the old
cohort is the majority; the tax rate will be at the Laffer point and the
skilled migration will be maximal. Otherwise, the policies implemented
are given in the equilibrium below.
The first equilibrium we look at is dubbed ”Intermediate” because it
captures the essence that the preferred policies of the unskilled workers are
a compromise from the extremity of the other two groups. We can show
that the following strategy profile forms a Markov-perfect equilibrium with
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strategic voting
es∗t =
{
s , if st ≥ 1+µt−11+n+µt−1(1+m)
u , otherwise
eu∗t = u (25)
eo∗t =
{
o , if 1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
≥ max{st, 1− st}
u , otherwise
and the policies implemented when no group is the absolute majority are
Φt =
(
τt =
1− 1
J
1 + ε− 1
J
, σt = 1, µt =
2 + n− 2(1 + n)st
m
)
(26)
where J = J(µt, σt, st, µt−1) is as in equation (17).
The equilibrium features the unskilled voters always voting for their rep-
resentative, whereas the other two groups vote for their respective candidate
only if they are the largest group, or for the unskilled candidate otherwise.
With these voting strategy, if no group captures 50% of the voting popula-
tions, the policy choice preferred by the unskilled candidate will prevail. One
notable difference is the policy related to the immigration volume. In period
t+1, as long as the skilled workers do not form 50% of the voting population,
the policies preferred by the unskilled workers will be implemented. To make
sure that this is the case, skilled migration is restricted to just the threshold
that would have put the skilled voters as the absolute majority in period
t + 1. The volume of migration, µ∗t =
2+n−2(1+n)st
m
, reflects the fact that the
threshold value for this variable can be pushed slightly farther. This level
can be shown to be higher than the restricted volume in sincerely voting
equilibrium.
In the preceding equilibrium, we let the preference of the skilled workers
and the old retirees decide the fate of the policies. In the following analysis,
the unskilled workers consider who they want to vote for. This will depend on
how extractive the tax policy preferred by old is. We call the next equilibrium
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”Left-wing”, because it features a welfare state of the size greater-than-or-
equal to that of the intermediate policy equilibrium. This may arise when
the tax rate preferred by the old voters is not excessively to redistributive.
When 1
1+ε
≤ τ˜ , we can show that we have an equilibrium of the following
form
es∗t =
{
s , otherwise
u , if 1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
≥ st ≥ 1+
n−m
2
1+n
eu∗t =

u
{
, if 1− st ≥ 1+µt−11+n+µt−1(1+m) , or
1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
≥ st ≥ 1+
n−m
2
1+n
o , otherwise
(27)
eo∗t = o
and the policies implemented when no group is the absolute majority are
Φt =

(
τt =
1− 1
J
1+ε− 1
J
, σt = 1, µt =
2+n−2(1+n)st
m
)
, if 1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
≥ st ≥ 1+
n−m
2
1+n(
τ ∗t =
1
1+ε
, σt = 1, µt = 1
)
, otherwise
(28)
where J = J(µt, σt, st, µt−1) is as in equation (17) and τ˜ is given implicitly
in equation (22).
When the tax rate preferred by the old voters is not excessively redis-
tributive in the eyes of the unskilled, we could have an equilibrium where the
unskilled voters strategically vote for the old candidate to avoid the policies
preferred by the skilled voters. This will be an equilibrium when the size of
the skilled is not ”too large.” Recall that, voting to implement the policies
selected by the old candidate leads to opening the economy fully to the skilled
immigrants. If the size of the skilled group is currently too large, there is
a risk of making the skilled voters the absolute majority in the next period
and will result in no welfare state in the retirement of this period’s workers.
The cutoff level before this happens is given by
1+n−m
2
1+n
. Therefore, voting for
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the old will only be compatible with the interest of the unskilled voters when
the tax rate is not excessively high and when the size of the skilled is not too
large.
We turn our attention to the next equilibrium. When 1
1+ε
> τ˜ , we can
show that there is an equilibrium with the following functions:
es∗t =
{
s , otherwise
u , if 1− st ≥ 1+µt−11+n+µt−1(1+m)
eu∗t =
{
u , otherwise
s , if 1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
≥ max{st, 1− st}.
(29)
eo∗t =
{
o , otherwise
u , if st ≥ 1+µt−11+n+µt−1(1+m)
and the policies implemented when no group is the absolute majority are
Φt =

(
τt = 0, σt = 1, µt =
2+n−2(1+n)st
m
)
, if 1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
≥ max{st, 1− st}(
τt =
1− 1
J
1+ε− 1
J
, σt = 1, µt =
2+n−2(1+n)st
m
)
, otherwise
(30)
where J = J(µt, σt, st, µt−1) is as in equation (17) and τ˜ is given in equation
(22).
When the Laffer point is higher than τ˜ , the tax rate is read as excessive.
In this case, the unskilled voters will instead choose to vote for the skilled
over the old candidate. The resulting equilibrium as the size of the welfare
state less-than-or-equal to that in the intermediate policy equilibrium, hence
we refer to it as ”Right-wing.” When the tax preferred by the old is excessive
from the perspective of the unskilled, the political process could implement
the policies preferred by the skilled in order to avoid the worst possible
outcome. This happens when the old voters constitute the largest group,
and the unskilled voters vote strategically for the skilled candidate. In other
cases, however, the policies preferred by the unskilled will be implemented,
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irrespective of the identity of the largest group in the economy13.
The equilibrium under strategic outcome for the case of endogenous wages
is similar to the case of fixed wages, given the new policy vectors, in the pre-
ceding section. Recall that for a policy rule to constitute a Markov-perfect
equilibrium with sincere voting, the policy rule today must take into the ac-
count the policy variables that will be implemented in the future using the
same policy rule. In particular, the decisive voter must consider the effect
that today’s policies will influence tomorrow’s policies through the policies’
influence on the state variable Recall that, under fixed wages, political coali-
tions are formed either between the skilled and the unskilled workers or be-
tween the old retirees and the unskilled workers. These formations continue
to be true under the case of flexible wages. The skilled workers prefer the
least number of skilled immigrants and the lowest level of tax. Thus they
will prefer the policy choice of the unskilled over the old candidate. On the
contrary, the old retirees want the highest degree of skilled immigrants and
the maximal size of the welfare state. Hence they will prefer the policy choice
13For our results with multidimensional policies, it is important to note here that the
ranking of candidates by individual voters allows us to escape the well-known agenda-
setting cycle (the ”Condorcet paradox”). Such a cycle, which arises when any candidate
could be defeated in a pairwise majority voting competition, leads to massive indetermi-
nacy and non-existence of a political equilibrium. The agenda-setting cycle will have a
bite if the rankings of the candidates for all groups are unique: no group occupies the same
ranked position more than once. However, this does not arise here, because, in all equi-
libria, some political groups have a common enemy. That is, because they will never vote
for the least-preferred candidate (the ”common” enemy), the voting cycle breaks down to
determinate policies above, albeit their multiplicity. This occurs when voters agree on who
is the least-preferred candidate and act together to block her from winning the election.
The literature typically avoids the Condorcet paradox by restricting political preferences
with some ad hoc assumptions. For our case, the preferences induced from economic as-
sumption lead to the escape of the Condorcet paradox. For discussions on agenda-setting
cycle, see Drazen (2000, page 71-72), and Persson and Tabellini (2000, page 29-31).
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of the unskilled over the skilled candidate. Which candidate the unskilled
workers decide to vote for depends on the gain from the labor and the de-
gree of redistribution of the Laffer point. All in all, the equilibria will look
identical to the one described in the preceding section.
6 Conclusion
We develop and analyze a PAYG welfare system and migration policies in a
political economy model that provides a resolution to tensions across gener-
ations and income groups. We built a dynamic politico-economic model fea-
turing three groups of voters: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and retirees,
with both inter- and intra-generational redistribution, resembling a welfare
state. The skilled workers are net contributors to the welfare state whereas
the unskilled workers and old retirees are net beneficiaries. We characterize
the politico-economic equilibria of the tax rate, skill composition, and the
total number of immigrants.
We show that, if the skilled workers are the decisive group, the tax rate
will be minimal, while if the old retirees are the decisive group, the tax rate
will be revenue-maximizing. When the decisive group is unskilled, the tax
rate higher than zero, but less than the maximum revenue point. Interest-
ingly, the difference between this tax rate the revenue-maximizing tax rate
is negatively related to the measure of inequality, that is, the skill premium
between the skilled and unskilled workers.
The native-born workers, whether skilled or unskilled, benefit from letting
in migrants of all types, because their high birth rates can help increase the
tax base in the next period. In this respect, skilled migrants help the welfare
state more than unskilled migrants, to the extent that the offspring resemble
their parents with respect to skill. In another respect, however, more mi-
grants in the present will strengthen the political power of the young in the
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next period who, relatively to the old, are less keen on the generosity of the
welfare state. Therefore, from this perspective, unskilled migrants pose less
of a threat to the generosity of the welfare state then skilled migrants. When
the skilled cohort grows rapidly, it may be necessary to bring in unskilled
migrants to counter balance the expanding size of the skilled group to ensure
the survival of the welfare state in the next period. The old retirees prefer
maximum level of skilled immigrants.
When there are more than two groups of voters, as we have, coalitions
between groups of voters may form in order to block another group’s accession
to power with strategic voting behavior. We find that two types of coalitions
might be formed between the three groups of voters: between skilled-unskilled
voters to block the old voters or between unskilled-old voters to block the
skilled voters. As such, the policies preferred by the unskilled voters will
always feature in any political economic equilibria.
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A Appendix: Endogenous Wages
In the appendix, we modify the production function to allow for endogeneous
wages. We want to allow for interactions between two skill-groups in the
production function, but in a parsimonious way. The production function
should capture imperfect substitution between the two groups. Moreover, it
should also display any complementarity effects one skill group may have on
the other. To stay in line with all these requirements and parsimoniousness,
we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function using two skills as inputs to
produce a single consumption good. The output is therefore produced by
the following production function:
Yt = (L
s
t)
α (Lut )
1−α
where α is the share of skilled income. The labor markets are assumed to be
competitive, hence the wage paid to the workers equal to marginal product
of the final worker hired, that is
wst = α
(
Lut
Lst
)1−α
and wut = (1− α)
(
Lst
Lut
)α
.
The preference of agents in the economy is the same as in section 3, making
the individual labor supply equals to
lst = (w
s
t (1− τ))ε and lut = (wut (1− τ))ε ,
which can be aggregated to aggregate labor supplies as before. The two labor
markets can be solved simultaneously to find the equilibrium wage for the
skilled and unskilled workers, respectively yielding
(wst )
1+ε = α1+εα(1− α)ε(1−α)
(
1− st + µt(1− σt)
st + µtσt
)1−α
(31)
(wut )
1+ε = αεα(1− α)1+ε(1−α)
(
st + µtσt
1− st + µt(1− σt)
)α
. (32)
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From the production function, there is really no distinct difference between
skilled and unskilled labor force, except from the fact that they are comple-
mentary to one another. To resolve this, we assume that wst > w
u
t , which
leads to α > st+µ
1+µ
. For sufficiency, we may assume α > 1+st
2
.14
A.1 Balanced-Budget
Similarly to the previous sections, the budget must be balanced in all periods.
We can make use of equation (31) and (32) in the labor supply equations to
simplify the balanced-budget equation as follows
bt
(
1 + µt +
1 + µt−1
1 + n+ µt−1(1 +m)
)
= τt ((st + σtµt)w
s
t l
s
t + (1− st + (1− σt)µt)wut lut ) (33)
= τt(1− τt)εαεα(1− α)ε(1−α) (st + µtσt)α (1− st + µt(1− σt))1−α .
The last equality follows from substituting for labor supply and wage equa-
tions and simplifying some algebra.
The last quantity necessary is the indirect utility of the young (as the
indirect utility of the old is simply Tt), which is given by
V ht =
(1− τt)1+ε
1 + ε
(
wht
)1+ε
+ bt + βbt+1
where h ∈ {s, u} denotes the skill level of the individual. Wages are given
in equation (31) and (32) for the skilled and unskilled, respectively, and the
14Given the nature of exogenously given skilled distribution and the simple skill dynam-
ics (described in equation (8)), this inequality maybe broken in the very long run as st ↗ 1
when t↗∞. We could alternatively assume a Markovian skill dynamics such that there
positive probability of being unskilled, depending on family background. For the purpose
of our positive analysis of period t and t + 1 in the proximity of non-binding condition,
the assumption we make should suffice, as long as we refrain from making very long run
inferences or steady-state behaviors of the political system.
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demogrant is from equation (33). Notice right away that, for the young,
immigrants affect them through two contemporaneous channels. The first
channel is through the labor markets, by either complementarity or substi-
tutability. The second channel comes from financing higher redistribution
and transfer in this period.
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